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Produced by this camp | US completes decapitation of Iran — the blockade is a show, but who will win and who will lose next?

This article was first published on the AceCamp official website on March 1, 2026, offering fresh perspectives and faster insights!

Summary

1. Statements from various Iranian factions are focused internally; the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is likely a short-term show, with a very low probability of large-scale retaliation.
2. The article independently simulates the six-party landscape (Trump, the US, Iran, Israel, Middle Eastern countries, and smaller nations) after the decapitation strike, reaching conclusions that clearly diverge from the current mainstream narrative.
3. It simultaneously provides short-term directional assessments for US stocks, US bonds, oil, gold, and silver, along with key verification signals.

1. Timeline of Iran's Decapitation Strike:

· June 13, 2025: A 12-day war broke out between Israel and Iran. During the same period, the US bombed three Iranian nuclear facilities (claiming 'complete destruction,' though the actual assessment is questionable), and Israel weakened Iran's air defense and eliminated several high-ranking IRGC officials. After the ceasefire, Iran secretly concealed highly enriched uranium.

· End of December 2025 to January 2026: Iran experiences its largest protests since the revolution due to currency collapse. The government violently suppresses the protests, and reformist leaders are arrested by the IRGC.

· February 6: The first round of indirect nuclear talks between the US and Iran was held in Oman. Significant gaps remain between the two sides, with the US demanding the permanent dismantling of all nuclear facilities and the handover of all enriched uranium.

· February 17: In the second round in Geneva, the two sides reached 'a general consensus on a set of guiding principles' (Iran briefly closed the Strait of Hormuz as leverage during the same period).

· February 26: In the third round in Geneva, the Omani Foreign Minister described it as a 'major breakthrough.' Both parties agreed to hold technical-level negotiations in Vienna the following week. The negotiations entered the most critical phase but ended without an agreement. On the same day as the most progress at the negotiating table, Trump received a detailed briefing on military strike options against Iran.Diplomacy and military efforts are advancing simultaneously on dual tracks without interfering with each other.

· February 27: The IAEA discovered that Iran had hidden highly enriched uranium in an undamaged underground facility.

· February 28: The US and Israel launched a joint strike (Israel’s operation codenamed 'Roar of the Lion,' the US operation codenamed 'Epic Wrath'), with approximately 200 fighter jets attacking around 500 targets, including the Supreme Leader's office and three senior gathering locations. Khamenei (along with his daughter, son-in-law, granddaughter, and daughter-in-law) and at least 40 high-ranking officials were killed (including the Defense Minister, IRGC Ground Forces Commander, and Secretary of the Supreme Security Council). Iran declared a 40-day national mourning period and vowed retaliation.

: According to sources from two US informants and Israeli officials cited by Reuters, Iran's top decision-maker and spiritual leader, Khamenei, held a meeting with his inner circle in Tehran that morning (Israeli and US military intelligence have long been monitoring and waiting for a rare opportunity where Iran's senior political and military leaders would gather in one place). The IDF stated that it struck 'two locations where senior security leaders were gathered' in Tehran, eliminating multiple high-ranking officials in simultaneous precision strikes.

· March 1, 2026: Israel continued its strikes on central Tehran, while the IRGC announced the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian President issued a statement declaring that Iran had launched missile/drone counterattacks against Israel and 27 US bases in the Middle East.

The US achieved a decisive victory at minimal cost through the dual advantages of its military intelligence network and AI capabilities.According to a Wall Street Journal report, the US military deployed the Claude AI model via the Palantir platform to assist in intelligence analysis and combat simulations. Notably, the three preceding rounds of US-Iran nuclear negotiations may have lowered Iran's defensive readiness, objectively creating conditions for intelligence infiltration and surprise attacks.This operation has almost wiped out Iran's core decision-making layer in one fell swoop,The only high-ranking officials still speaking publicly are top security official Larijani, Foreign Minister Araghchi, and President Pezeshkian.

2. Characteristics of Iran's factions and ethnic groups: A state of leaderlessness prevails, with no faction possessing sufficient authority or military capability to rebuild unified leadership. Additionally, without Khamenei at the helm, ethnic issues are likely to erupt.

2.1 Hardline Theocracy

Centered around the late Khamenei, representing the ideological foundation of the Islamic Republic. This faction controls the judiciary, media, education, and religious institutions (Hosseiniyeh, mosque networks). While not directly commanding the military, it holds ultimate theological authority over the IRGC and military operations. Khamenei himself was of Azerbaijani-Persian descent but promoted a unified Persian-Islamic narrative within the system,suppressing ethnic separatism. After Khamenei’s death,the issue of succession has become the most critical power vacuum—the Assembly of Experts is theoretically responsible for selecting the next Supreme Leader, but its functionality has been severely impaired under the current conditions of widespread targeting.

2.2 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

The most significant power. Controls ballistic missiles, drones, cyber warfare, proxy networks (such as Hamas, Houthis, Hezbollah), and dominates a substantial portion of domestic economic assets (construction, energy, finance, etc., accounting for approximately 30%-40% of GDP). In this strike, the commander of the ground forces, Mohammad Pakpour, was killed. The IRGC's supreme commander, Hossein Salami, was eliminated in the June 2025 war, and his successor also perished in the February 28 attack.Currently, the IRGC is leaderless, but its military machine continues to operate.(Still launching missiles and blocking the Strait of Hormuz). Basij (a militia organization) falls under the IRGC and has been used for domestic suppression, playing a leading role in quelling protests.

2.3 Conservative faction

Represented by Ali Larijani — following this strike,he is the highest-ranking political official known to still be aliveand immediately announced the formation of a temporary leadership council, warning separatist forces. Former President Ahmadinejad (reported dead on the evening of March 1) represents another branch that had previously been suppressed by Khamenei and currently holds limited political influence. This faction advocates maintaining the Islamic Republic system but shows more flexibility in economic and diplomatic policies. They do not directly control troops but have strong influence in parliament and the bureaucratic system. The speaker of parliament, Ghalibaf (a former IRGC general), also belongs to this group, possessing both military and political backgrounds.

2.4 Reformist faction

Symbolically represented by President Pezeshkian, the reformists have been systematically purged in reality — in February 2026, the IRGC intelligence department arrested key leaders such as Azar Mansouri, the head of the reformist front. The core demands of the reformists (expanding civil liberties, diplomatic engagement, economic reforms) have no operational space in the current state of war.They lack military power, and their domestic support has waned due to economic collapse, leaving them politically marginalized.。

2.5 External opposition/exiled groups

Reza Pahlavi (former crown prince) has been exiled and claims to have secure communication channels with 50,000 defectors from within the system. The Opposition Coalition also claims that Iran has entered an 'irreversible crisis.' These two forces have gained some international political recognition, buttheir actual mobilization capacity domestically is limitedand there are ideological differences between them (monarchists vs. secular republicans).

2.6 Ethnic/regional armed forces

Kurds have attacked the IRGC during protests and occupied parts of urban buildings in Kermanshah. Baloch nationalist armed groups (PPF alliance) are also active. Larijani has directly warned 'separatist forces,' indicating that the central government’s control over peripheral regions is under real threat.

Ethnic characteristics: The main ethnic group in Iran is Persian (accounting for 50%). After the decapitation strike, the vacuum of central authority may activatecentrifugal tendencies in peripheral ethnic regions— Kurds (10-14%, western mountainous areas, with long-standing separatist armed groups), Baloch (2%, southeastern Sistan-Baluchestan Province) have taken the lead, while Arabs (2-3%, southwestern Khuzestan Province, with past independence aspirations) and Azerbaijanis (approximately 20 million people, accounting for 24%) are potential variables.

3. The reaction of various factions in Iran to the assassination: Outwardly strong but internally weak, signs of civil war and long-term chaos have emerged, with statements focused domestically,lacking the courage to confront the United States directly. The author expects the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz to be a short-term event.

The Iranian president (reformist faction) made an outwardly strong but ultimately empty public statement: On March 1, a statement was issued indicating that responsibility for the incident, including both direct perpetrators and masterminds, would be considered their own responsibility and legitimate right, and vowed to take necessary measures in response.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps blockades the Strait of Hormuz: On February 28, they announced a ban on any vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz, and an unauthorized tanker attempting to pass through was sunk. The attack location was five nautical miles north of Khasab Port in Oman's Musandam Province.

Larijani (conservative faction): Announced the establishment of a temporary leadership committee, accusing the US and Israel of attempting to 'dismantle Iran,' and warned separatist forces would face severe consequences.

Iranian official media (hardliners): Initially claimed that Khamenei "remains alive and steadfast in his position," constructing a narrative of being "unbeaten." Subsequently, the country entered a phase of information control, issuing an emergency decree: those spreading "rumors" or "causing fear" will be prosecuted for "national security crimes."

Exiled faction (Pahlavi et al.): Actively signaling, calling on the Iranian military to defect, claiming that "the Islamic Republic has collapsed."

Kurdish armed forces: Have intensified military pressure amidst the chaos.

4. Follow-up scenarios of Iran's decapitation operation

1) For Trump

The current situation is the optimal outcome for Trump in the short term. This operation effectively shifted domestic public opinion, with his approval ratings expected to rise significantly, increasing the odds of success in the midterm elections. More importantly, the consecutive successes in Venezuela and Iran have formed a clear political narrative: showcasing overwhelming US strength at minimal cost – precise intelligence advantage, strong military execution, without falling into a protracted war of attrition – perfectly aligning with the core MAGA demand of "always win." For further analysis on tariffs, refer toHas Trump’s tariff policy really been countered? The legal 'repackaging' of US tariffs and the new landscape of asymmetric games。

2) For the United States

This operation significantly bolstered America's global deterrence, compelling more countries to lean towards the US in their interest-based negotiations. From a strategic gains perspective, this was an action achieving maximum geopolitical results at minimal cost. Going forward, the US will not deploy ground troops; its primary focus will be handling sporadic, small-scale terrorist attacks and other low-intensity retaliations. Overall, the risks are manageable.

3) Iran

Iran is currently in a severe state of disarray, with no faction possessing sufficient authority or military capability to restore unified leadership. Public statements from various parties indicate a general lack of courage to confront the US directly. Thus, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is more likely a short-term political performance aimed at showcasing a tough stance to domestic audiences rather than reflecting genuine strategic intent. The likelihood of large-scale retaliation is relatively low, and Iran may instead plunge into prolonged internal power struggles and multi-party conflicts.

4) Israel

This operation has been most beneficial for Netanyahu personally – the ongoing chaos in the Middle East will further solidify his domestic political standing. Strategically, Israel has established a new order of prestige in the region by eliminating its most important strategic rival. With Iran, the command center and financial backbone of the 'Axis of Resistance,' being dismantled, the coordination capabilities and subsequent resource supply of proxy forces across the region will substantially diminish, leading to a significant downgrade in mid- to long-term threats.

5) Other Middle Eastern countries

Gulf states like Saudi Arabia will further strengthen their reliance on the US. For a period of time, oil exports may require US naval escorts, essentially constituting an arrangement where strategic security is traded for protection. Meanwhile, neighboring countries and regions around Iran—such as Dubai—face the tangible risk of being drawn into its civil war or affected by spillover conflicts.

6) For other smaller and medium-sized countries

The US’s external posture has notably strengthened. Political leaders of other nations, when confronted with such a direct display of military power, will tend to comply rather than oppose in their negotiations with the US. Security-dependent nations like South Korea and Japan are expected to make greater concessions. Meanwhile, the author notes thatThe narrative distillation is undermining its foundation: the pricing logic of HALO trades is more fragile than you might think.The probability of a policy intervention risk, which has not yet been priced in by the market, has increased somewhat.

5. Asset Price Impact Forecast

1) US Stocks

The core driver remains the AI narrative, and the current positioning structure is generally unfavorable for reaching new highs. If market focus shifts to issues such as the release of DeepSeek V4, the spread of private credit risks, pressure on CAPEX return on investment, or a tenfold difference in token prices between the US and China, further pullbacks could occur. However, if the narrative shifts to 'real-world validation of AI in this decapitation operation' — prompting sovereign nations to increase AI military and infrastructure investments — a new short-term upward momentum may emerge.

2) US Treasuries

In the short term, as geopolitical tensions ease temporarily, safe-haven funds will flow back into risk assets, causing a slight pullback in Treasury prices, with the 10-year Treasury yield expected to rise above 4%. Medium-term outlook (one-year horizon): The rise in oil prices mainly stems from the brief shock of the Strait of Hormuz closure, but as the situation stabilizes, oil prices will return to a reasonable range, posing limited real interference to the Fed's rate-cutting pace.

3) US Crude Oil

In the short term, prices could potentially spike to $80-$85 per barrel but are likely to retreat afterward. Iran’s interim leadership has expressed fear of retaliatory strikes in public statements, making the likelihood of a prolonged blockade of the strait relatively low.

4) Gold, Silver

There is some short-term momentum, but the probability of breaking historical highs is relatively low. The major geopolitical systemic risks have been partially alleviated for now. Going forward, internal turmoil in Iran will be the main issue, which falls within the scope of localized conflict and has a relatively manageable systemic impact on global asset classes.

Risk Warning: The above represents personal views only; please bear the risks yourself.

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